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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND INTERLINKING OF TRANSACTIONS
THROUGH THE SELF-HELP GROUPS
GilbertoM.Llanto *
Introduction
The recentinternationaldebt crisisand the failureof inward-looking,
capital-intensivedevelopmentstrategyof manydevelopingcountriesto
deliverthe expected growth inwealth and incomes for the vast majorityof
their population created a renewed interest in an agriculture and rural-
based development approach. The reversal of strategies is anchored on
both efficiency and equity grounds. Unlike the earlier view which sees
the agricultural sector as a source of investible surplus for industry, the
currentthinking isthatthedirectdevelopmentof thesectorisanend in itself,
considering the largeand growing concentrationof impoverished people
in the sector.
Inthe Philippines, this meant the redirection of resourcesto the rural
sector which contributes almost one-third of gross value added,
generates60 percentof export earnings,employs halfofthe laborforceand
providesjobs for 70 percent of the population.
Thus, financial reforms, among others, have been introduced in the
rural financial markets to create a hospitable economic and financial en-
vironment for growth in the rural areas. These financial reforms include
the deregulation of interest rates, the consolidation of some twenty
separate government credit programs into the Comprehensive Agricul-
tural Loan Fund (CALF), which used to guarantee loans madeto the rural
borrowers, especially small-scale farmers, fishermen and rural
entrepreneurs, the rehabilitation of an ailing rural banking system and
the move of the Central Bank away from direct involvement in credit al-
location and development finance to the traditional Central Bank function
of money supply management and supervisionof the financial system.
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One of the issues concerns the rural borrower's accessto the financial
servicesofformalfinancial institutions.Small entrepreneurs,fishermen, and
farmersfinditdifficulttoget bankcreditandareleftwith twopossible sources
ofcredit: (a)self-finance, and (b) informallending.Inthe Philippines,these
small borrowers have traditionally reliedon informal lenders in.view of the
limitationsofself-financeand lackofaccesstobankcredit. Table I provides
an ideaof the extentof dependence on informal loans in the rural areas of
the Philippines. This dominance by the informal lenders often happensin
highly segmentedcapital markets of developing countries where different
borrowersface "different effeC.tive prices" (McKinnon 1973) for land, labor,
commoditiesand capital.
This paper discusses the small borrowers' lack of access to bank
credit and other financial services within the framework of the asymmetry
of information that exists in rural financial markets. Asymmetric informa-
tion drives a deep wedge between the vast number of small rural bor-
rowers and formal financial institutions making loan contracting difficult.
The paper shows that the observed phenomenonin the rural areas of in-
terlinking transactions between banks and various rural-based organiza-
tions like farmers' associations and self-help groups provides a
convenient mechanism to ensure access to bank credit and fiscal dis-
cipline among borrowers.
The paper is organized intofour sections. The first section discusses
howasymmetric information prevents accessto bank credit by small rural
borrowers. Section 2 is a brief description of the informal credit markets
in the rural areas. Section 3 discusses interlinking in the rural financial
market as a responseto the imperfect informationstructure. In particular,
it describes the phenomenon observed in the rural areas of self-help
groups linkingwith the banks as convenient mechanismto ensure access
to bank credits. Section 4 deals with the scope for public policy.
AsymmetricInformation in RuralFinancial Markets
The transaction in credit markets is not similar to transactions in other
markets like the goods market. Inthe lattertype of market, the task and
objectives are relatively simpler: sell the good and the transaction is ter-
minated upon receipt of payment. The commodity seller does not worry
aboutwho the buyer is or what happens to the commodity after the sale
as long as hegets paid.
A loan transaction is much more complicated. A great deal of infor-
mation both on the personal characteristics of the borrower and the
project appliedfor financing is required. It is crucial for the bank to know
the viability of the project, the loan purpose, the creditworthiness of theLLANTO: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 149
Table 1, EXTENT OF BORROWING FROM FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOURCES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Aulhor/Year Credit Source
Period of Publication Number of Loans/ Formal Informal
Covered or Release Farmer-Borrowers (Percent)
1954-56 de Guzman (1957) 2411 loans 12.0 88.0
1957-58 Gapud (1958) 256 loans 10,0 90,0
1957-58 Sacay (1961) 916 loans 13.0 87.0
1960-61 BCS (1963) 1,679.000 loans 7.8 92.2
1967-70 Mangahas (1975) 151 Borrowers 11,9 88.1
1970-71 Mangahas (1975) 297 Borrowers 20.9 79,1
1969-70 Almario (!970) 138 loans 37.7 62.3
1969-70 Balagot (1974) 134 Borrowers 21,6 78.4
1973 DA (1974) 620 loans 51.3 48.7
1973-74 PCARR-Baecon (1974) 3,30_1 loans 92.2 7.8
1974 Cigaral (1977) 421 Borrowers 94.0 6.0
1975-76 DA
Iloilo (Feb 1977) 341 loans 82,7 17.3
Iloilo (Jan 1977) 703 loans 67.6 32.4
Zamboanga (Apr 1977) 551 loans 74.6 25,4
1976 DA (1976) 268 farmers 17,2 • 82.8
1977 UPBRF (1977) 1,079 loans 36.9 63,1
1977 DA (1977) 405 farmers " 5.2 94,8
1977 TBAC (1978) 656 Borrowers 25,8 74,2
1978 DA .(1978) 338 farmers 3.8 96.2
1978 TBAC (1981) 2,110 loans 17.4 82.6
1979-80 NIA-SGV (1980) 299 farmers 20.0 80.0
1981-82 TBAC (1984) 871,600 loans '. 40,2 59.8
1986 SWS (1986) 1.200 respondents 33.0 67.0
1986 ACPC(1988)* 1,000 households 16,0 72.0
Data comparability is limited by differences in sampling,
BCS Bureau of Census and Statistics
DA Department of Agriculture
PCARR Philippine Council for Agricultural Resources Research
BAECON Bureau of Agricultural Economics
UPBRF University of the Philippine Business Research Foundation
TBAC Technical Board for Agricultural Credit
NIA National Irrigation Administration
SGV Sycip. Gorres and Velaye
SWS Social Weather Stations
ACPC Agricultural Credit Policy Council
• Propodions for formal and informal will not add up to 100%. The remaining 12%
borrows from both formal and informal sources,
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borrowerand his strategicbehavior.
A good part of the time is spent in locating a "good" borrower and a
"good" project. After the bank has judged the project to be viable and
creditworthy, it still has to determine whether it has a "good" borrower.
Unlike the commodity seller who does not worry about the character of
the buyer, the bank is concerned with the character of the "loan buyer" or
borrower. Amongother things, the bank worries aboutwhat the borrower
will do with the loan, how it will be used and whether he will abide by the
terms and conditionsof the contract (see Clemenz 1986). 1
The bank undertakes to commit financial resources without complete
certainty of whether or not the contractwill bekept. It also knows that the
loan contract is subject to willful default. Borrowers know themselves
better than the bank,their own industriousness and moral standards and
have "inside information about their own projects (Leland and Pyle
1977). But because borrowers have potentially great gains from under-
stating personal as well as the project's weaknesses and "exaggerating
positive qualities" (ibid), they can not be expected to fully disclose all
relevant personal and project information. The information transfer is
thus hamperedby serious moral hazards and incentive problems.
Becausethe profitability of the financial transaction is dependent to a
great extent on the probability distribution of borrower default risk, the
bank employsscreening techniques to insulate itself from default risk. It
seeksborrowers with low probability default and small administrative and
transaction costs. This drives banks to be conservative with respect to
their lendingoperations and to employstrict sortingtechniques.2
The amount and quality of information about the borrower and the
project will determine the rejection or acceptance of a loan application.
Adverse incentives on the part of borrowers who are inclined to mis-
represent their true worth and character are counteracted by the bank's
referencesnot onlyfor those with profitableand bankable projects, but also
those with proven credit track recordand acceptable collaterals.
The bank, therefore, becomes concerned not only with the expected
1. Where there is time lag between receipt of a commodityand payment, as in
transaction wherethecommodityissoldoncredit,similarproblemsmayarise.However,as
Clemenz(i 986)pointed out,moreimportant andinterestingproblems ofthiskindareobserved
in labormarkets,insurance and creditmarkets.
2.Asidefromitsbeinga profitcenter,thebankmustalsobe understoodinthe lightof
itsobligation todepositors.Itisafinancialintermediary andthereforeseeksoutpublicdeposits
andacts bothas abrokerof Ioanablefundsandan assettransformer.At the sametimeit is
a fiduciaryinstitutionwhichmust be circumspectwithdepositors'money. This isanother
reasonfortheconservatism ofbanks.Theyhavetomakegoodaocountofthemselvesnotonly
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net return from lending but also with variables such as collateral,
borrower'sequity,cashflows,consumption patterns,otherindebtedness,
willingness to payandthe personalcharactedstics of the borrower. The
upshotis that the asymmetricinformationobtainingin credit (especially
ruralcredit)marketsdrivesbanks to installelaboratescreeningsystems
to help locate a good borrower,a viableprojectand =sure"incomeor
profits.
The seriousinformation problemin ruralfinancialmarketsengenders
a creditmarketstructurethatiscomplexandveryinformation-dependent.
The institutional biasagainstthe smallruralborrowersisattile sametime
formidableand severe. Loancontractingbecomesa big problemespe-
dally to borrowers whocan notsendthe appropriate signalsorindicators
of bankability.On the other hand,the significantcosts involvedin infor-
mationproduction andtransfermakethe banksgunshy.
The rural credit markets are peopled by very heterogenousrural
economic agents whose attributes,characteristicsand personal cir-
cumstancesarenot entirelyacceptabletothe bank. On the other hand,
the bank and itsoperationsmaybe totallyalien to manyof these rural
economicagents. Fromeitherend, aninformation gapexistswhosesize
maydepend onthe particularside, rural borroweror bank,that is con-
sidered.
The asymmetricinformationdeniesthe rural borrowereffectiveac-
cesstofinancialresourcesandthebanklosesthe opportunity tointermedi-
atethe ruralsurp!us.The denialofaccesstofinancial resourcescanbe
illustrated bythefollowingcredittransactionmatrix(Figure1).
If bothtransactorshave "perfect"or at least satisfactoryinformation
abouteach otherandthe projectfor fundingas in cell (A), a loaniscon-
tracted. When the informationstructurefor bothbanks and rural bor-
rowersisinefficient orimperfect,partialcontracting, whichmayinclude credit
rationingresultsasincells(B)and (C). The extremeresultofcellD isdue
toa very seriousinformation gapbetweenthetwotransactors.
Informal Credit Markets in Rural Areas
A significantpartof the complexruralfinancial markets structureis
the informal source of credit, the informal lender. The traditional
moneylenders arethe landlordsbutlately,a newclassofinformallenders
composedoftraders,inputsuppliers, bigfarmers,warehouseownersand
spousesofoverseascontractworkershasemerged.
The majority of rural borrowers in the Philippineshave always152 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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depended on informal lenders for credit. Even at the height of the
government-sponsored credit programs like the Masagana 99, the great
bulk offarmers continuedto relyon informal lendersfor credit. Sacay etaL
(1985) reportthat Masagana 99 reached asmany as 530,000farmers at
one time or roughly one-third of all the rice farmers in the country.
Informal lenders are able to hurdle the information barrier in rural
credit markets and maintain low transaction costs which make their lend-
ing operations cost- effective. In the first place, the rural borrower and
the informal lender literally know each other quite well enabling the latter
to form a more accurate probability distributionof the farmer's default risk
and factor itintothe loan contract. The information wedge can thus be
easily eliminated because both transactors operate within the same or
familiar socio-cultural andeconomic milieu. The informal lender has the
distinctcomparative advantageof knowing his borrower,the specific rural
community or economy where the borrower lives and he has at his dis-
posal a reliable (althoughinformal ) communication network and a set of
informantsthat help him assessthe likelihoodof repaymentand default.
Furthermore, both transactors are able to produce a loan contract
that includes such specific characteristics as flexible repayment
schedules, variableamountsof loan amortization,adjustable collateralre-
quirements, payment of the loan at the farm gate and similar features. In
effect, the loan contract that is negotiated and finally agreed upon takes
into account the specific circumstances of the locality and the rural
borrower.
Another feature of informal credit markets is the ability of transactors
to locate and present a substitute to the traditional land collateral which
orthodox financial institutions normally require. The collateral substitute
makes loan contracting an easier task to accomplish since it helps to
close the information gap between borrower and lender by sending sig-
nals as to the willingness and capacity of the rural borrower to repaythe
loan.
The collateral substitutecomes in avariety of forms depending on the
requirementsof the particular informal lender and the characteristicsand
needs of the borrower. The Agricultural Credit Policy Council 1988 Sur-
vey on Informal Credit Markets reveals several collateral substitutes
adopted by the informal credit markets. These are: a) thirdparty guaran-
tees where the loan isgiven onthe strengthof a guaranteeprovided by a
third person, usually somebody with the means to repay the loan if the
original borrower defaults; (b) tied contracts where the loan is given on
the promise or agreement that the lender will be the sole or principal
buyer of the produce at mutually acceptable implicit interest rate; (c)
threat of loss of future borrowing opportunitieswhich for as long as it rep-
resentsa credible threat is an effective meansto keep the integrityof the154 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
loan contract; and (d) the mortgaging of tenancy or cultivation fights
which affords the mortgagee to derive actual and beneficial use ofthe
land which yields him returns over and above the earnings derived from
the principal.
interlinking in Rural Financial Markets
While there may be valid reasons for the existence of informal
lenderssuch as the financialservicethey renderto clientswho are not
entertainedbythe formalfinancialinstitution,itcan notbe deniedthatin-
formal lendingalso has its limitations. 3 Real financialintermediationis
the domainof financialinstitutions whichprovidea safe haven for the,
rural surplusanda sourceof investiblefunds for rural entrepreneurs.
The problemwith informal finance is its inability to sustain the credit
needs of a growing rural economy and to intermediate the ruralsurplus.
The formal financial institutions, on the other hand, are able to ac-
complish these tasks. The bank is a multi-product firm whichprovides not
only loans and deposit-taking services but also other financial services
such as brokerage services, portfolio management and investment
counselling. These are productswhich are clearly beyond the capability
of informal lenders to produce or provide. However, they must gear up
for business dealing with rural entrepreneurs. From the other end; rural
entrepreneurs must look for concrete ways to reduce informational and
transaction costs and present themselves as worthy bank clients.
The interlinking of transaction that is commonly observed in rural
credit markets provides some insights for developing a systematic and
activerelationshipbetween the banks and rural borrowers. An interlinked
transaction, following Bell (1988),takes place when two partiestrade inat
least two markets on the condition that the terms of all such trades are
jointly determined. A number of studies point to the interlinked transac-
tions as (a)an efficientway to reducethe excessive costs of acquiring in-
formation between transactors in imperfect markets (Bardhan 1980;
Basu 1984); (b) an efficient economic response to unequally distributed
information arisingfrom the uncertainty in agriculture (Mitra 1983); and
(c) a significantdevice to reduce transaction costs since it is somesort of
a screeningdevice which preventsborrower default. (Basu 1984).4
3. Acontraryviewisthecriticism thatinformallendersusetheirdormantposition inthe
ruralsectortoexploitthe smallfarmerborrower.
4, Bardhan(1980) andothersnotedthatintedocking transactions,saycredittransac-
tionswith wage contracts,is also a sourceofadditionalmonopolypowerfor the dominant
partnerinsuchtransactions.See alsoGangopadhyay andSengupta(1987; 1986);Bhadud
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The costly production and transfer of information betweentransac-
torsintheruralfinancialmarketsmayruleoutthechanceforsmallruralbor-
rowersto everget a loan. At the sametime,the situationcreatesincen-
tivesto renegeon loancontractswhen individualcalculationsshowitto
be advantageous.In eithercase,a contracting problememerges. In the
firstcase,noloancontractmaybe madeinviewof the tremendousinfor-
mationgap betweentransactors. This is case D in Figure 1. In the
secondcase,a repeat transactionand a renewedloancontractmay be
ruledoutwhenthereiseffectivedefaultonthe firsttransaction.
One exampleof creditinterlinksthatisobservedin rural Philippines
that bears considerationis the attemptto forge linkagesbetweenthe
banksand ruralorganizations likethe self-help groups. Self-helpgroups
are voluntary associationsof people at the grassrootslevel that are
formed in orderto copewiththe difficulties of conductingeconomicand
businessactivitiesin the rural economy. The membersare heldtogether
by a common objectivewhich is to addresseconomic and/or non-
economicproblemsaffectingthe well-beingofthegroupmembers.
In the ruralfinancialmarkets,the self-helpgroupscome in different
varieties:rotatingsavingsand credit associations, credit unions,credit
cooperativesandfarmer'sassociationsorganized,owned,operatedand
controlledby the peoplethemselves. Afterorganizingand establishing
themselvesas viable groups,some of theseorganizations tryto linkup
withthe bankstodevelopaccesstoformalfinancialresources.
Underthe linkupconcept,aninstitutional linkortie- upwiththe banks
is developedeitherthroughthe initiativeof the groupitselfor the bank.
The linkisnota passiveandone-sideddeposit-taking relationship onthe
part of the bank. It appearsto be an active and mutuallybeneficial
economicandfinancialexchangebetweentwo parties. There is a vast
rangeof contractingpossibilities offeredbythelink.
In one case study documented by the AgriculturalCredit Policy
Council(ACPC), a corporationwas organizedby a ruralbank's stock-
holdersandthe bank'sfarmer-borrowers 5 to (a) screenor filterloanap-
plications,(b) instructits farmer-memberson the rudimentsof finance
witha strongemphasison depositmobilization and loanrepayment, and
(c) act ascollectionagentof the bank. Thisphenomenon bearswatching
becauseitseemstooffer a workableapproachto removethe information
barrierin the ruralfinancialmarkets. Figure2 illustrates thisrelationship.
The PigcawayanAgro-lndustdalCorporation(PAIDCOR) is a rural-
based corporation organizedby (a) 11 privatestockholders of the Rural
Bankof Pigcawayanin Cotabato,SouthernPhilippines;(b) 273 farmers
5. E. MorteandG. Llanto."A Bank-FarmerApproachto RuralCredit: The Caseof
PAIDCOR,ACPC, 1989,Othercasesarediscussedinthe ACPCCaseStudiesofSHG-Bank
LinkageSchemesinthe Philippines.156 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Figure 2: PAIDCOR LINKING MODEL
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borrowersof the ruralbank;and (c)the RB Pigcawayanitseff. It helps
farmersget production loansfromthe ruralbankat the prevailing market
ratesof interestand at the sametime actsas a fund conduitand some
sortof a guaranteeto farmer loans. Paymentsare madein kindto PAID-
COR whichtake chargeof repayingthe bank loansin cash. It markets
the farmers' produce and providesthem with post-harvest,processing
and marketingfacilities. Italsooperatesa FarmersMutualBenefitFund
whichconsistsofthe collectivesavingsofthe farmer-membersof PAID-
COR.
The Fund is the farmer's source of consumption and emergency
loans during lean months. Because it is not a mere conduit but a line of
first defence against a bad or defective loan, PAIDCOR reducesthe in-
formation gap and transaction costs inherent in small farm credit. It is a
strategicdevice to keep the rural bank away from bad loans;at the same
time it identifies the more creditworthy farmer borrowers. In case of
default, PAIDCORas a corporationof like-minded individuals with a com-
rnoninterest, exertspressureonits member-borrowersto repaythe loan.
Otherwise, other members' access to bank credit will be cut. PAIDCOR
which is tasked to collect t.heloan can enforce the loan contract more
efffectivelythanthe rural bankcandowith anordinaryclient. The bankdoes
not have enoughinformationand pressuretechniquesto enforcecollection
unlike this self-help group which has the appropriate information on its
membersandcanexertenoughpeerpressureto assureloanrecoveryfrom
amongits members.
Asymmetric Information and the
Scope for Public Policy
Information iscostlytoproduceespeciallyinthe ruralareas. Theremay
belittleincentive toa privatebankto investinthe production ofinformation
inviewoftheheterogeneity ofpotential borrowers,the spatialdispersion of
agricultural activitieswhichincreasesriskanduncertainty,thevadability of
yields,fluctuatingterms of trade and the complexcharacterof socio-
economicrelationsinthe ruralareas. Incompleteinformationandinmany
instances,the lackof it, prevents the realization of loan contractsbetween
formalfinancialintermediariesandnumerousruralborrowers. Onthe other
hand,the informal lender's insideinformationand hislow transactioncosts
givehimanedgeover banksand heusesthiscomparative advantagequite
extensivelyasshown by pastsurveys.
Whatemergesthen is a myriadof contractsbetween informal lenders
and rural borrowers which are designed and adopted to the idio-158 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
syncracies of the localityand the characteristicsof the borrower. Some
oftheseconditions involve anyofthe following:
a) a tied contract where the borroweris obliged to sell his produce
to the trader lender at a price stipulatedbythe latter;
b) repaymentof principal and interest in kind as in the caseof corn
farmers in Southern Mindanao, Philippines;
c) mortgageof cultivation rights to the lender for a specified period
of time as observed in Central Luzon,Philippines;
d) better terms like lower interest rates and longer maturities for
tested borrowers' and
e) terms and conditions suited to the specific geographic location
andthe borrowers' individual characteristics.
These variegated contracts indicate the ease with which the informal
credit marketscan adjust to the specific needsof the transactorsand its
abilityto hurdlethe informational problempresentedby rural lending.
It is very tempting at this point to invoke government intervention in
view of the incomplete market structure and the existence of asymmetric
informationin rural financial markets. Theorthodox approach isto create
state-ownedorcontrolled banks or similar organizations to provide direct
competition to the informal lenders. It is held that state- owned banks
should lend to rural borrowers at subsidized rates since private banks
especiallycommercial banks, are not intended to operate in ruralfinancial
markets. The competition is supposed to influence informal lenders to
bring down their interest chargeson rural borrowers and cease from ex-
ercisingmarket power.
There is however, no clear-cut case for direct state intervention.
Considering the huge information problem, it is doubtful whether state-
ownedbanks can as efficiently producethe same valuable, inside infor-
mation that informal lenders now possess and whether they can
simultaneously keep transaction costs sufficiently low to give them a
competitive edge. Furthermore, the element of credit subsidyopens the
door for various rent-seeking exercises whether by private agents or
government bureacrats. The case for direct state intervention is also
weakened by the worldwide experience that a market - driven economy
whichreliesto a very great extent onprivatesector initiativeand enterprise
performsbetter than one where there isa large public sector involvement.
The same experience also shows that a finandal system largely
dominated by state-owned or controlled banks brings about more distor-
tions and inefficiencies than a market-driven system.
Whatthen isthe scope for public policy? Beforethis iseven discussed,LLANTO: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 159
some interesting points need to be considered. Because information
generationiscostlygiventhe natureof the ruralfinancialmarkets,private
banksmaybe discouragedto investin itsproduction, or at the most,will
underinvestin itsproduction,leavinga very large numberof unsatisfied
borrowers.
A bank,especiallya commercialbank may simplybe overwhelmed
by the sheer numberof rural borrowers, many of them smellfarmers
withoutor littlecollateral,the relativesmallnessof the loansappliedfor
andthe risky natureof agricultural undertakings. Itwillnottake painsto
learnorknowmoreintimatelythesewould-beclientsgiventhe costsand
the uncertaintyof appropriation. 6
On the otherhand,certainprivateparties likethe self-helpgroupsdo
infact attemptto producethisinformationin orderto create avenuesof
accessto bankcreditandservices. They internalizethe costsof acquir-
ingandgeneratinginformation andusethistotapbankresources.Theonly
difference,however,is thatthe expectedoutputmay be verygroup-and
location-specific. The self-helpgroupsseemableto solvethe information





The abilityto processvaluableinsideinformationleadtothe creation
of a normof contractualbehavior whichmakes membersobserveloan
contracts. Willfuldefaultcan leadto peersanctionand even to eviction
from the group. Since the group satisfiesthe needs of the individual
member,terminationof membershiponaccount of a willfulbreachof con-
tractis a costlyexperienceto defaulters. Thus, loancontractsare kept
and repeatloansare assured.
Credit market interlinkingin the manner described here is akin to
whatLanda(1988) callsthe Chinesestrategyof =particularizing exchange
relations." This is built on mutualtrust developedover time and the
operationof effectivesanctionsagainstdeviantbehavior. These self-help
groupscouldbeoperatinglike=clubs"with the=rulesof the game"toen-
forcecontracts. Atthe coreof thisgroupisvaluableinsideinformationon
its membersgeneratedby the group. Whenthe self-helpgrouplinksup
with the banks (in the process cuttingthe middlemanrole of informal
lenderswho themselvesborrow from the banks and lend to individual
6. Another masonisthatthe commercialbankshavealwayshadtieswithcommemial
and _'adinginterestsand are in fact originallyestablishedto servicethe needs of these
interests.They arethereforemorecomfortable withthis typeofclientelethan the ruralfolk.160 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
rural borrowers), it employs the information so generated to assure the
banks of the integrity of the loan contract and brings to its membership
valuable information about the bank, the services it offers, the bank's own
=rulesof the game" and the whole gamut of banking technology.
The specificity of information and particularistic rules of exchange
which determine contractual behaviour within the club are its greatest as-
sets. However, they are also ironically the main limitations of the link-up
concept because the relationship that has been described ,sofar between
the bank and the self-help group may be specific, particular and applicable
only to one self-help group. This means that each self-help group has to
develop its own link with the banks and this may be a long, expensive and
tedious process for the entire community of self-help groups. It must also
be noted that the self-help group would tend to be small in size (i.e., there
are a few members) because congestion problems and friction arise once
unlimited expansion isallowed, itssmall size means that only afew farmers,
at best a few hundreds, may constitute an efficient group. If credit interlink-
ing is considered to be a feasible solution to the problem of lack of access
to bank resources, itwould seem that it isconstrained bythe tedious process
of creating such links. The issues that come to mind concerns its replicability
on a large scale and its sustainability in the long term.
What may be the role of the state in this context?
1. There is some scope for the production of information that will
primarily be of use to the banks. The government through its
departments and various agencies is in constant contact with
many indigenous, grassroots and self-help organizations. This
close contact yields valuable information about the strengths and
weaknesses of these organizations. It can therefore install a sys-
tem of accreditation whereby the identified self-help groups are
conferred some "status" which sends a clear signal to formal
financial institutions about the bankability of the group and its
members, in effect, what is created is information of a public
character whose consumers are private banks and whose producer
is the state.
2. A more active role of the state may be the allocation of resour-
ces for upgrading the creditworthiness of the individual rural bor-
rowers and the self-help groups through skills training on various
aspects of financing, project identification,project management and
so forth. Insome instances, the lack of funds is not the constraining
factor but the incapability of individuals and groupsto manage the
funds and ensure repayments.LLANTO: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 161
3. Sinceinformationisneverperfect,therewillbe attendantrisksin
anyendeavor.Acasefora guaranteecoverforruralloansmaybe
madeinthis regardinordertooffsetpart of the defaultrisk.The
governmentmaywant to enter intosome risk-sharingschemes
wherebyitagreestoprovidecoverforthe majorpartofthe default
risk.In a way, the guaranteecover may substitutefor the hard
collateralsoften required by the banks. This is thephilosophy
behindthePhilippine government's decision inlate1986toradically
alterthe approachto rurallendingby scrappingthe majorcredit
programsinthe agricultural sectorandpooling the Ioanablefunds
intothe ComprehensiveAgriculturalLoanFund(CALF) whichis
then used to guarantee rural-basedloans. The CALF does not
attemptto providefull or 100 percentguaranteecover because
suchonlyraisesseriousmoralhazardand incentiveproblemson
the part of the banks.Instead,risksare shared,albeitthe major
• portionof itlieswiththe government. Table2presentsthe perform-
anceof the CALFinthe pasttwoyearssinceitsinception.
The ComprehensiveAgriculturalLoanFund(CALF) isessentiallya
guarantee schemethat covers up to 85 percentof the default risk of
agricultural loansgivenbythebanks.Thefarmerborrows fromthebankand
if hequalifiesfora loan, he can get a guarantee cover from the CALF
afterpaymentof a premium. The banksharespart of the defaultrisk(15
percent)notborneby CALF. Table2 indicatesthe loanamountscovered





The CALF isexpectedto workas a toolto improvethe creditworthi-
ness of the farmer and strengthenthe bankingsystem. The recent
recordsindicatethat only6.2 percentof farmer-borrowersoutof 14,400
borrowersdefaulted but for valid reasons. This guaranteeschemeen-
couragedthe banksto lendto smallfarmerswho turnedoutto be good
bankclients.162 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT '
Table2. CALF GUARANTEE COVERAGE AND GUARANTEE PAYMENTS
Number of
LoanAmount Borrowers Guarantee Number of
Reached Payment 2/ Defaulters
(Thousand US$) (Thousand US$)
12702 14400 66.5 892
."
i/ June 30, 1989
2/ August 9, 1989. Causes of loan default are drought, typhoon,
pest infestation.
•Source: Agricultural Credit Policy CouncilLLANTO; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 163
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